There is no issue more intertwined with individual freedom than the right to change one’s beliefs, traditionally known as “apostasy.” The discussion on this matter began in the last century, with some advocating for the preservation of traditional jurisprudential opinions regarding apostasy, mostly from the Salafi stream. Others supported reinterpreting these rulings.
While modernization projects in the Islamic world have prioritized the advancement of societies and raising awareness among their citizens, the intensity of division resulting from differences in beliefs or doctrines may hinder the desired progress. Such division poses an obstacle to overcoming stagnation and regression.
To determine a stance on this issue, it is essential to establish the guiding references. Here, I refer to the right to life as a fundamental factor shaping the stance. By “human reference,” I mean the innate nature and hidden psychological interactions that cannot be ignored when forming positions and making choices. It expresses the natural inclination and legitimate aspiration to feel the self’s value in life. All alternative references are obliged to respond and interact with this formative instinct.
I say this because, when I was devoted to Islamic jurisprudence and history, I did not personally agree with such a ruling. I never accepted Islam imposing social hypocrisy, compelling people to conform outwardly to what they don’t believe in. I experienced a tremendous internal conflict between what I felt and understood and what I was told was an indisputable part of Muslim norms.
Dealing with a fundamental value framing human life and regulating human relationships requires, when dealing with religious texts, a return to clear and explicit foundational texts—the Quran, the primary source for the nation. Priority should be given to texts with clear linguistic formulations, rhetorical contexts, and connections over foundation, theorization, generality, and applicability. Other texts should be linked to the contexts of revelation, history, time, and place.
When dealing with Prophetic traditions, it is necessary to select what aligns with established texts, referring anything else to historical contexts and the spatial-temporal constraints it encountered. A distinction should be made between Prophetic actions done in the name of prophecy and message and those related to leadership, politics, administration, jurisdiction, and management—an ancient distinction mentioned by many Muslim scholars.
Defenders of freedom of belief do not think they need a contemporary methodology to deal with religious texts on this subject. The approach is no different from dealing with other topics. Even if the result differs from the majority of jurists, the methodology employed does not deviate from theirs, using only the established tools within the frameworks of principles, interpretation, and jurisprudential extraction.
Nothing is clearer or more explicit than the saying of Allah: “There is no compulsion in religion; the right course has become distinct from the wrong” (Quran, 2:256). The wording leaves no room for claiming abrogation or specification. Although formulated in a positive manner, it serves as news about the nature of human beings, their composition, which does not accept coercion and compulsion, an order not subject to abrogation, whether in initiation, continuation, or termination.
It is true that several hadiths mention the killing of apostates, such as “Whoever changes his religion, kill him,” and other hadiths conveying similar meanings. However, these hadiths contradict the unequivocal Quranic rule against compulsion. How can major judgments be arranged based on single-narrator, speculative hadiths that do not provide definitive evidence and, furthermore, contradict the Quran?
Moreover, apostasy and its rulings were historically linked to the political reality of that time. Religion was synonymous with national identity. The state had a religious identity, and loyalty to the religion was exceptionally strong. Anyone choosing a different religion aligned with the state they adhered to in that religion. Defection posed a political threat to the state’s entity. Transitioning from one sovereignty to another without changing belief was inconceivable. This is a depiction inconsistent with people’s current ability to change religions while retaining their national identity and loyalty to their countries.
A law like the apostasy law is a key to sowing the seeds of hypocrisy, a fundamental rule for the concept of compulsion and coercion, and a storehouse for the state of fear. A state that forces its citizens to adopt a specific ideology, threatening them with severe consequences if they deviate politically while maintaining their political loyalty. No sound mind can accept this situation and attribute it to Islam, which has consistently emphasized freedom of choice: “We guided him to the way, be he grateful or be he ungrateful.”
Scholars and official institutions must play a significant role in consolidating a contemporary jurisprudential pattern, developing interpretative tools rather than unjustifiably clinging to the heritage. There are numerous books printed each year that do not go beyond verifying traditional texts or simplifying their content. However, it is rare to find a jurisprudential book reevaluating these opinions, explaining the factors that led scholars to adopt them, and building a jurisprudential content suitable for contemporary reality.
This can only be achieved by firmly establishing the modern concept of the state in the public consciousness, elucidating its foundations and structures. It must be clarified that it is entirely different from the structure of the traditional state. Consequently, its rulings also differ from those of the traditional state. Then, people can understand without tension that Islam protected the Muslim’s right to apostasy.
Mohamed Abdelwahab Rafiqi
Thinker and researcher in Islamic studies, specializing in issues of extremism, terrorism, and religious reform. He is also an activist, human rights advocate, writer, and presenter of television and radio programs. Currently, he serves as an advisor to the Moroccan Minister of Justice.
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